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A PROPOS OF PROFESSOR PERRY: A PLEA FOR
PHILOSOPHY IN SEXUAL ETHICS
PAUL J. WEITHMAN*

I want men and women to be able to think sex, fully, completely, honestly and cleanly ....

The mind has to catch

up, in sex: indeed, in all the physical acts. Mentally, we lag
behind in our sexual thought, in a dimness, a lurking,
grovelling fear which belongs to our raw, somewhat bestial
ancestors. In this one respect, sexual and physical, we have
left the mind unevolved. Now we have to catch up, and
make a balance between the consciousness of the body's
sensations and experiences, and these sensations and
experiences themselves.'
In Law, Morality and "Sexual Orientation,"John Finnis argues
that orgasmic sexual activity between two people of the same sex
is always morally wrong.' Like Michael Perry, I disagree with Finnis' thesis. There are, however, more and less compelling arguments against that thesis. More to. present purposes, there are
more and less compelling ways to show that the arguments Finnis
offers for his thesis fail to establish it. While I agree with Professor Perry that Professor Finnis' thesis is false, I do not think that
his reply to Professor Finnis takes adequate account of the
strength and nuance of Finnis' position. I therefore do not think
that his criticisms of Finnis' argument have the force they should.
I begin by indicating briefly what I take two of the strengths of
Finnis' arguments to be.
I.
Philosophical reflection on sexual ethics has historically
been dominated by two problems. The first of these we might
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame.
1. D.H. LAWRENCE, A Prpos of "Lady Chatterly's Lover", in PHOENIX II 487,
*

489-90 (1968).
2. John Finnis Law, Morality and "Sexual Orientation"69 NOTRE DAME L.
1049, 1055 (1994) [hereinafter Finnis, L. REv.], reprinted in 9 NoTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 11 (1995) [hereinafter Finnis, J.L. ETHicS & PUB.
POL'Y]. It is important to note what FinnIis does not say: he does not'say that
REv.

those who engage in sexual activity are in mortal sin or even that they are
blameworthy. Whether they are so are, as Finnis correctly assumes, separate
questions.
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call the "problem of disorder." This problem arises, it is said,
because sexual impulses are unruly passions which need somehow to be controlled by reason. When uncontrolled, these passions are thought to bring disorder and, in the worst cases,
disintegration both to individual human agents and to the various communities to which they belong. The second problem we
might call the "problem of degradation," a problem which arises
because sexual. impulses can motivate the exploitation or degradation of both the agent and his sexual partners. While various
philosophers may have been more concerned with one problem
or the other, no philosopher has to my knowledge focused exclusively on either one of them. Rather, the goal of philosophical
treatments of sexual ethics has been to show how human beings
might avoid them both. Finnis' concern with these traditional
problems is clear. One of the strengths of his argument, however, is that it calls attention to a third problem relevant to the
philosophical treatment of sexual ethics, but largely ignored by
it.
Professor Finnis argues that homosexual couples cannot
"actualize and experience" the common good of their relationship by orgasmic sexual activity. Neither, Finnis argues, can heterosexual married couples who use contraception. He insists
that homosexual and heterosexual couples who believe otherwise
are mistaken "whatever the generous hopes and dreams and
thoughts of giving with. which [they] may surround their sexual
acts. .. ."' The "attempt to express affection by orgasmic nonmarital sex [is] the pursuit of an illusion."4 In defending these
claims, Finnis implicitly draws attention to the fact that our
capacity for judging our own and others' sexual activities and
experiences can be clouded by fantasy, illusion and self-deception. While some romantic and sexual fantasies and illusions
may be harmless or even beneficial, there can also be moral failure and tragedy associated with acting episodically upon, building a solitary life upon, or building relationships upon, fantasy
and illusion. The many moral problems posed by sexual fantasy
and illusion are problems that philosophical reflection on
human sexuality has largely ignored. Whatever the demerits of
Finnis' conclusions about non-marital sexual intimacy, it is a
merit of his arguments that they presuppose the centrality of,
and draw attention to this larger set of problems.
3. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1067 (emphasis in original); Finnis,J.L.
ETHics & PUB. POL'Y, supra note 2, at 29 (emphasis in original).
4. Finnis, L. REV., supra note 2, at 1065; Finnis, J.L. ETHics & PuB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 28.
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Another merit of Finnis' arguments is the sophistication
with which they avoid some of the defects characteristic of arguments earlier in the natural law tradition. Seeing this requires
seeing how Finnis argues for the thesis that orgasmic sexual activity between two people of the same sex is always wrong.
Finnis' argument is to be found in the paragraph running
from pages 1066-67, the paragraph that Perry refers to as paragraph 6.' The argument is very compressed, with a number of
suppressed premises. But I believe the structure of the paragraph's second half clearly shows that Finnis relies on the following line of reasoning:
(1) "[T ]he common good of friends who are not and cannot be married (for example man and man, man and boy,
woman and woman) has nothing to do with their having
children by each other, and their reproductive organs cannot make them a biological (and therefore personal) unit."
(2) Therefore "the activation of one or even each of their
reproductive organs cannot be an actualizing and experiencing of the maritalgood."
(3) So there is no "common good that could be actualized
and experienced by and in this bodily union."

(4) So orgasmic homosexual activity can "do no more than
provide each partner with an individual gratification."
(5) Therefore "that conduct involves partners in treating
their bodies as instruments to be used in the service of
their consciously experiencing selves."
(6) So "their choice to engage in such conduct thus disintegrates each them precisely as acting persons."
(7) Therefore engaging in orgasmic homosexual activity is
always wrong.
Since Finnis thinks (4) follows from (3) and (2), his argument for (4) must depend upon the claim that homosexual
couples who engage in orgasmic sexual activity cannot actualize
and experience the common good of marriage. This claim, in
turn, depends upon Finnis' argument that that good is actualized
by the voluntary and uncontracepted "union of the reproductive
5. The argument of that paragraph is, as Finnis acknowledges, a
recapitulation of an argument found in what Finnis calls "the new second
volume of [Germain] Grisez's great work on moral theology." Finnis, L. Rxv.,
supra note 2, at 1063; Finnis,J.L. Ermics & PuB. PoL'Y, supra note 2, at 25. The
acknowledgement of the debt to Grisez for the argument running from pp.
1066-67 is found at Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1067, n.47; Finnis, J.L.
ETHics &'PuB. POL'Y,- supra note 2, at 29, n.47; the reference is to GERMAiN
GIusEz,

THE WAY OF THE LoRD JEsus: LIVING A CHIusIAN

662-64 (1993).

Lin

634-39, 648-54,
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organs of husband and wife." That argument is summarized in
the first half of the paragraph, and ends with the phrase "that act
of genital union."
The argument, if laid out in detail, would be long and complicated. The most charitable reconstruction of the argument6
would, I believe, show that it depends upon these claims:
7
(8) "[R]eproduction is one function."
(9) The voluntary and uncontracepted "union of the[ir]
reproductive organs"' is the way husband and wife typically
or naturally unite to perform the function of reproduction.
(10) Groups (including pairs) constitute "units" or single
.realities" of the sort that has a given function if they are
united in the way that groups or units typically or naturally
unite to perform that function.
* (11) Common goods can be actualized and experienced
only by groups (including pairs) which constitute "units"
or single "realities."
The argument that the common good of marriage is realized by the voluntary and uncontracepted sexual union of husband and wife therefore depends crucially upon the notion,
mentioned in (1), of a "biological (and therefore personal)
unit." It is because spouses, in their sexual union, constitute a
unit of the sort that has the function of reproduction that they
can actualize and experience the common good of marriage.
And, Finnis thinks, it is because homosexual couples cannot constitute such a unit, even by intimate sexual union, that they cannot actualize and experience the common good of marriage.
From this Finnis thinks (4), and ultimately the wrongness of
orgasmic homosexual conduct, follow.
How do Finnis' arguments constitute an advance over earlier
natural law arguments for similar conclusions? Neither the argument of the first half of the paragraph, nor that of the second,
depends as Finnis says upon "any norm of the form 'respect natural facts or natural functions.' "- Nor does either argument
depend upon claims about the natural purposes or teleology of
the reproductive organs, purposes which would be frustrated by
contracepted or homosexual sexual unions.' ° Earlier natural law
6.
7.

I provide such a reconstruction in the appendix to this article.
Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1066; FinnisJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y,

supra note 2, at 28.

8. Finnis, L. REV., supra note 2, at 1066; FinnisJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 28.
9. Finnis, L. Rv., supra note 2, at 1068; FinnisJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 31.
10. S.eJOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHT 48, 55 (1980).
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arguments which appeal to these claims suffer from their implausibility. More specifically, Finnis thinks, .it is always an open question whether or why natural functions should be respected. To
assume that the question is closed, as Finnis thinks earlier natural
law thinkers did, is to commit a version of the naturalistic fallacy.
Finnis' argument against homosexuality, by contrast, depends
upon a claim not made explicit in the paragraph under consideration. That claim is that human beings must never choose to act
against the good realized by the "biological (hence personal)
units" constituted by voluntary, uncontracepted, heterosexual
union. Unlike natural functions, goods are worthy of respect
and Finnis' claim that it is at least prima-fade unreasonable to
choose to against them is plausible. Finnis may, as I believe he is,
be wrong to conclude that homosexual unions cannot actualize
common goods. But because his arguments do not depend upon
the naturalistic fallacy, they mark an advance in natural law
thinking about human sexuality.
II..
Perry's criticism of Finnis presupposes that "Finnis falsely
believes that even in the context of a homosexual friendship that
is a lifelong, monogamous relationship of faithful love,, homosexual conduct 'can [never] do [any] more than provide each partner with an individual gratification.'" It also depends upon
Finnis' "forthrightly acknowledg[ing], in his essay, that his point
is not confined to homosexual cOnduct,: but applies to heterosexual conduct that is, in Finnis' words, 'deliberately
contracepted.' "11
Perry's criticism of Finnis seems to be that these two claims
are false: both orgasmic homosexual activity and deliberately
contracepted orgasmic heterosexual activity, he claims, can
enable the couples in question to actualize and experience the
common goods of their relationships. Perry writes:
Interpersonal sexual conduct, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, can be a way of affirming and serving both
.the sexual and the emotional wellbeing of one's lover; as
such, sexual conduct can both express, in a bodily (embodied) way, one's love for one's lover; indeed, at its best such
conduct can be a generative matrix of the emotional
strength one needs to live well.... Sexual conduct can be
11. Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John
Fiihis,9 Nomx DAMEJ.L. ETHics & PuB. P6L'V 41, 51 (1995) (quoting Finnis, L.

REv., supra note 2, at 1065-66; Finnis, J.L. ETHics & PUB.
28).

POL'Y,

supranote 2, at
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all this (and more) even if it is not meant
to be-indeed
12
even ifit is meant not to be-procreative.
Perry's criticism thus depends upon his claim that Finnis'
theses are contradicted by what he calls the "real-world experience" of those who engage in the sexual practices in question.
Thus he says that
[o]ne who, on the basis of his or her real-world experience-indeed, perhaps on the basis of his or her experience in marriage-disagrees with Finnis' point as applied
to 'deliberately contracepted' heterosexual conduct has
good reason to be skeptical that Finnis' point as applied to
homosexual conduct has any firmer grounding in realworld experience."3
A few paragraphs later, he remarks that "[t]he reality apprehended by many married couples who practice contraception,
and by many homosexual couples, is directly contrary to the reality postulated by John Finnis ...."14
The fact that Finnis' theses seem to be contradicted by the
experience of "many married couples who practice contraception, and many homosexual couples" does not itself show that
Finnis' theses are incorrect. Of course, it would show that Finnis'
theses are incorrect if it were conjoined with a sound argument
for the conclusion that the experiences of these couples are
veridical.
Does Perry provide such an argument? He says "Finnis is
reduced to claiming that the reality apprehended by many married couples who practice contraception and by many homosexual couples, unlike the reality asserted by him, is illusory."'" The
word 'reduced' in this sentence suggests that Perry's argument
for the veridicality of such experiences and against Finnis is to be
understood as a short reductio ad absurdur
(12) Suppose such experiences are not veridical.
(13) Then the experiences of the homosexual and deliberately contracepting heterosexual couples in question
would be illusory.
(14) It is impossible, or highly improbable, that the experiences of so many couples can be illusory.
(15) Therefore such experiences are or have a high
probability of being veridical.
12.

Perry, supra note 11, at 51-52 (emphasis in original).

13.
14.

Id. at 52.
Id. at 59.

15.

Id.
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(16) Therefore (12) is false, or has a high probability of
being false.
(17) Therefore Finnis' theses are false, or have a high
probability of being false.
The crucial premise in this argument is premise (14), a
premise for which Perry seems to offer no explicit defense. Of
course, if Perry simply asserts (14) without defense, that would be
tantamount simply to asserting that (12) is false and that Finnis is
wrong. That, in turn, would be to beg the question at issue. So
perhaps Perry should be interpreted as saying that such experiences, or some significant subset of them, enjoy a presumption
in their favor, as do some of the judgments based upon them. At
least some of the judgments rendered by homosexual and contracepting couples on the basis of these experiences seem to be
rendered under optimal or nearly optimal conditions by reasonable people whose judgments on other matters are worthy of
credence. There is, moreover, widespread consensus on such
judgments, consensus that includes "millions of Christian married couples."1 6 In addition, Perry may think that reasonable
individuals are uniquely and specially qualified to judge of their
own experiences of satisfaction and well being. 7 Finally, intuitions may support the judgments of some couples that, because
of their circumstances, contracepted or heterosexual sex is best
for them. Anyone who, like Finnis, wants to deny (14) therefore,
Perry might say, bears a preponderous burden of proof. The
onus is on Finnis, Perry might conclude, to show that (14) is false
rather than on Perry to defend it.
.How might Finnis attempt to shoulder this burden? Note
first what Finnis does not claim. He is not arguing for the thesis
that all who engage in contracepted or homosexual sex are morally blameworthy. He claims instead that all who engage in such
activity are doing something that is morally defective, for which
16. Id. In an earlier version of this comment I interpreted Perry's
argument differently. I took the reference to "many married couples" and
"millions of Christian married couples" later in the same paragraph to imply that
the number of people who render such judgments testify to the veridicality of
experiences on which such judgments are based. Id. That is, I took it that the
number of people who render such judgments was intended to support the
claim expressed in (14) rather than the quite different claim that (14) enjoys a
presumption which Perry's critics are obliged to rebut. I therefore
misunderstood how Professor Perry thinks consensus bears on his argument
against Finnis. See id., at 56, n.39. Of course, this paragraph's suggestion that
Perry thinks Finnis bears the burden of proof may be similarly mistaken since I
cannot find support for it in Perry's text. I simply put it forward as a conjecture
about how he might be understood.
17. I owe this suggestion to John Howard Yoder.
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they may or may not be culpable. This is compatible with the
claims that, because of circumstances, the best that some couples
can do is to engage in an activity that is morally defective and
that, because of circumstance, they do so non-culpably. Therefore, Finnis' claim is compatible with, hence not contradicted by,
a couple's sound judgment that, in light of circumstance, contracepted or homosexual sex is best for them. Whatever intuitive
support such a judgment enjoys does not weigh against Finnis'
position and he is not, therefore, in the position of having to
discount those judgments. The judgments that he must regard
as erroneous or illusory are judgments that, because of circumstance, homosexual or contracepted sex is objectively good for,
or not objectively illicit for, the couple in question. It is these
judgments, perhaps, that Perry thinks enjoy a presumption in
their favor. But how strong is that presumption?
Finnis, I suggested earlier, implicitly points to a large set of
moral problems concerned with the role of fantasy and illusion
in human sexuality. Among those problems, Finnis would claim,
are those posed by the fact that some fantasies, illusions and misconceptions about the value of various forms of human sexuality
can be very widely held. Since these fantasies, illusions and misconceptions can cloud the judgment of those who hold them,
and since it is possible many people hold them, then it seems
possible that the judgments of large numbers of people can be
clouded by them.
Anyone who wants to maintain that this is not a live possibility should recall that claims about widespread sexual illusion and
misunderstanding are the stock in trade of would-be sexual
reformers. Consider, for example, Bertrand Russell's contentions in Marriage and Morals. There Russell claimed that Christian sexual mores are both false and so deeply held that they
exercise effects on intellect and judgment of which agents are
unaware, including judgments about the pleasure and value of
their own sexual experience."8 He wrote that
the whole system of Christian ethics, both in the Catholic
and Protestant forms, requires to be re-examined, as far as
possible without the preconceptions to which a Christian
education predisposes most of us. Emphatic and reiterated assertion, especially during childhood, produces in
most people a belief so firm as to have a hold even over the

unconscious, and many of us who imagine that our attitude
18. Thus he seems to have thought that accepting Christian sexual mores
led people to judgments which are at odds with what he called "biological
facts."

BERTRAND RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MoRALs 43

(1948).
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towards orthodoxy is quite emancipated are still, in fact,
19
subconsciously controlled by its teachings.
As this passage suggests, Russell thought those mores were
very widely held in the western world of his day. It seems, therefore, that Russell put forward an argument for liberalizing sexual
mores that presupposes just the sort of widespread sexual misconceptions and illusions that Perry claims are improbable.
Perry thinks it absurd of Finnis to hold that sexually active homosexual couples and deliberatively contracepting heterosexual
couples are deluded. Russell, however, anticipated such and
objection and argued for just the opposite conclusion:
The fact that an opinion has been widely held is no evidence whatever that it is not utterly absurd; indeed, in view
of the silliness of the majority of mankind, a widespread
belief is more likely to be foolish than sensible.2 °
D.H. Lawrence seems also to have thought that the England
of his day was in the grip of widespread sexual delusions and
misconceptions. In A Propos of "Lady Chatterly's Lover" Lawrence
gives a different and far more subtle description of these illusions
and their consequences than does Russell in Marriageand Morals.
For present purposes, however, the differences are irrelevant.
Like Russell, and unlike Perry, Lawrence takes very seriously the
possibility that large numbers of people are in the grip of illusions and fantasies of which they are unaware and which significantly, color their sexual experiences and judgments.2 1
Moreover, Russell, Lawrence and Finnis are at one in pointing to
the consequences of living sexual lives of illusion: the alienation
of mind or self from body and, in effect, the "disintegration" of
the agent as an acting person.2 2
I do not adduce Russell and Lawrence to prove that sexual
delusions and misconceptions are in fact widespread. I intro19. RUSSELL, supra note 18, at 49-50 (emphasis added).
20. RuSSELL, supra note 18, at 50.
21. See also LAWRENCE, supra note 1, at 492-93.
22. Lawrence says that "[I]ife is only bearable when the mind and body
are in harmony, and there is a natural balance between them, and each has a
natural respect for the other. And it is obvious that there is no balance and no
harmony now. The body is at the best the tool of the mind, at the worst, the

toy."

LAwRENCE,supra

note 1, at 492. A few pages later he concludes "[tihe

disintegrative effect of modern' sex-activity is undeniable." LAWRENCE, supra
note 1, at 508.
Russell says that "the older morality has been allowed 'to poison love, filling
it with gloom, fear, mutual misunderstanding, remorse and nervous strain,
separatinginto two regions the bodily impulse of sex and the spiritual impulse of ideal
love...." RUSSELL, supra note 18, at 223 (emphasis added).
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duce them merely to buttress my suggestion that such delusions
are live possibilities. For the suggestions of Russell and Lawrence
that sexual illusion is widespread do not seem to me obviously
absurd or impossible. If Perry agrees and recognizes the possibility that Lawrence and Russell were correct, then he must recognize the possibility that Finnis could be. If Perry recognizes the
possibility that large numbers of people were in the grip of a sexually conservative illusion (as Russell and Lawrence alleged),
then he must recognize the possibility that large numbers of people are in the grip of sexually liberal one (as Finnis alleges). Or
at least, he must do so unless he can argue for some relevant
difference between the possibility of conservative and the possibility of liberal sexual illusions. Perry has, however, provided no
such argument.
Even the possibility of widespread sexual illusion may not
itself rebut the presumption Perry alleges in favor of the experiences and judgments on which his reductio depends. But recall
that Finnis has, in support of his claims about sexual illusion,
both a highly developed natural law theory and an explanation
of how the illusion he alleges came to be widespread. Finnis'
natural law theory was laid out in great detail in his book Natural
Law and NaturalRights"3 and has been developed by Finnis and
his collaborator Germain Grisez in subsequent work. Among the
central features of that view are accounts of practical reasoning
and of the "basic goods" pursuit of which renders human action
intelligible. A plausible reconstruction of Finnis' argument for
the illicitness of orgasmic homosexual conduct would show that
the argument depends at crucial points upon this theory. Finnis'
explanation of widespread delusion would appeal, I believe, to
the operation of a number of forces which shape what Finnis
calls "the public realm or environment."2 4 These forces can, Finnis
23.

JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHrS

24.

Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1053 (emphasis in original); Finnis,

(1980).

J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y, supra note 2, at 14 (emphasis in original). Perry
writes:

In Finnis' view, no doubt, it is an illusion aided and abetted for the
Christian couples by all those ministers and priests and theologians
who do not submit to the position that Finnis defends. Finnis may
want to reflect on the significance of the fact that only one-quarterof all
American Catholic priests accept the Church's official teachings on
contraception-and only a little more than half of them (56%) accept
the Church's position on homosexual conduct. Are all those
dissenting priests-many of whom daily minister to married couples
or to homosexual couples or to both-in the grip of an 'illusion,' too?
Perry, supra note 11, at 59. Not only would Finnis answer in the affirmative, but
he would, I believe, follow the Papal encyclical VEnrrATIs SPLENDOR in arguing
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would argue, foster (false) moral beliefs supportive of orgasmic
homosexual activity. Indeed this is among the reasons that Finnis thinks it important for the state to discourage such activity.
Finnis offers an argument against the licitness of homosexual activity which is backed by a powerful and highly developed
philosophical theory. Finnis' argument and the supporting theory imply that sexual illusion is widespread. They therefore
imply that the judgments of large numbers of people are in
error, and Finnis has at his disposal an explanation of the error's
propagation. In the face of this, it is insufficient simply to point
out, as Perry seems to, that some of the allegedly erroneous judgments enjoy an unspecified presumption of truth and some of
the allegedly illusory experiences on which they are based enjoy
an unspecified presumption of veridicality. Much more needs to
be said about the source, nature and strength of those presumptions before Perry can plausibly adduce as decisive against Finnis'
claims precisely the experiences which Finnis himself explicitly
argues are illusory. I conclude, therefore, that Perry accepts (14)
too readily and that his criticism of Finnis stands in need of
much greater argumentative support than he provides.
III.
The passage with which I opened this comment is drawn
from an essay in which D.H. Lawrence explains why he wrote
Lady Chatterly'sLover. In that essay, Lawrence intimates that creative intellectual work on human sexuality, work which challenges
widely accepted sexual norms, can be a valuable corrective to the
judgments of the majority and can facilitate clarity of thought.
Lawrence embodied his intellectual work in his literary essays, in
his poetry, in his short stories and in novels like Lady Chatterly's
Lover. The first of the passages I quoted from Russell's Marriage
and Morals shows that Bertrand Russell thought that the sexual
ethic widely accepted in his day needed to be re-examined without pre-conceptions. He though philosophers like himself had a
responsibility to conduct that examination: like Lawrence, Russell thought it the task of intellectuals to foster clear thinking
about human sexuality.
Perry criticizes Finnis for doing sexual ethics "a priori" and
says of his arguments that they are "(inappropriately) abstract." 2
Yet Finnis is, I believe, doing just what Russell and Lawrence recthat theological dissent is, itself among the mechanisms by which sexual illusions are propagated among people of good will. SeeJOHN PAUL II, VERrrATIS
SPLENDOR

25.

132-34 (1990).
Perry, supra note 11, at 52.
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ommended and just what they did themselves: creative intellectual work on human sexuality which challenges sexual mores
widely held in their culture. The need for such intellectual work
is apparent once we recognize that the "real world experience" to
which Perry appeals. Human beings' experience of their own
sexuality and sexual activity is a cognitive experience. It essentially involves the application of concepts, the passage of judgments on, and the formation of beliefs on the satisfaction, joy,
pleasure or affection of the activity. The passage of these judgments and the formation of these beliefs involve appeals to
norms, expectations and ideals about human sexuality. These
norms, ideals and expectations are, in turn, subject to assessment
for their cogency and intellectual defensibility. Thus popular
judgments about human sexuality need always to be checked
against the best intellectual work on the subject. Since some of
this intellectual work is philosophical, widely held judgments
about human sexuality must be checked against the best available philosophical arguments. Other of this work is in history,
anthropology, literary criticism and gender-studies; these disciplines too are relevant to the critical assessment of sexuality and
"real world experience."
As I mentioned earlier, the second of the merits of Finnis'
position is that it marks a significant advance within natural law
theory. His arguments deserve to be seriously and carefully
assessed, and their premises stated as clearly as possible. This
brings us to the crucial questions about Finnis' paper. Just how.
strong are the philosophical arguments Finnis provides? How
strong are the premises on which a charitable reconstruction of
his argument shows him to rely? Are the inferences he makes
valid inferences?
My object in this essay is to comment on Perry's paper and
not on Finnis'; anything like an adequate assessment of Finnis'
arguments would therefore exceed my limited scope. 6 I want to
conclude by raising questions about Finnis' arguments for the
moral wrongness of homosexuality, questions that merit further
exploration.
First, Finnis' argument depends crucially upon the claim
that two persons of the same sex cannot be constituted as a biological unit by the "activation" of their sexual organs. 27 This
26. I give Professor Finnis' arguments closer attention in my contribution
to LAws AND NATuRE'(Martha Nussbaum & David Estlund eds., forthcoming
1995).
27. Finnis thinks that "activation" of human sex organs in a heterosexual
union is a necessary condition for the constitution of a biological unit. He does
not, however, think it sufficient. He would argue, I believe, that a biological
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claim depends, I believe, upon the further claims that biological
units have functions and that there is no biological function performed by a homosexual union. But from the fact that a homosexual coupling does not constitute a biological unit or perform a
biological function, it surely does not follow that this coupling
does not constitute a unit of any kind or that it performs no function at all. Whether or not it does depends upon what Finnis
means by "function," a notion he leaves unexplained. Why
couldn't a homosexual coupling constitute two people as a social
unit, the function or characteristic activity of which is to promote
their friendship and love through special acts of physical intimacy and tenderness?
Perhaps Finnis would reply that this suggestion grants him
his point. For suppose that orgasmic acts of tenderness and intimacy do help to actualize and experience the good of friendship
in a homosexual relationship, as giving an especially pleasing gift
to another might enable the giver and recipient to actualize and
experience their friendship. Still, Finnis might say, the sexual
pleasure of orgasmic homosexual activity itself is, on this suggestion, a good experienced by one or the other of the partners,just
as the pleasure of receiving a gift is a pleasure experienced only
by the recipient, regardless of the commonality of the experiences that follow. But to grant that sexual pleasure is individual
in this way, Finnis might say, is to grant his point.
The problem with this reply is that Finnis needs
a stronger
claim if his argument that orgasmic sexual acts are always wrong
is to succeed. He needs, not just the claim that the sexual pleasure of such lacts is private rather than common, but:
(4) orgasmic homosexual activity can "do no more than provide each partner with an individual gratification. "28
My suggestion may presuppose that orgasmic homosexual activity
"provide [s] each partner with an individual gratification," but it
also presupposes that such activity does much more. It presupposes that the mutual gratification. of orgasmic homosexual activity provides the occasion of, and thus serves the function of,
promoting emotional intimacy.
Second, as noted above, Finnis deploys against orgasmic
homosexual activity an argument that he thinks applies to all
unit of the sort which has the function of human reproduction is characterized,
not only by its biological states, but also by its intentional ones; if is for this
reason that I included the word 'voluntary' in (9). What exactly those
intentional states are remains to be specified.
. 28. Finnis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1066; Finnis, J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 29 (emphasis added).
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deliberately non-procreative sex. Perry, in arguing against Finnis, argues that both deliberately contracepted heterosexual
activity and orgasmic homosexual activity can be morally acceptable. Perry's strategy suggests that Finnis and Perry share a presupposition: that the same moral considerations are relevant to
determining the licitness of these two kinds of sexual activity.
But why suppose that? Why not think that very different moral
considerations are relevant to the questions of whether to engage
in orgasmic homosexual activity and whether to engage in heterosexual sex in a way designed to prevent conception? These certainly seem like very different questions.
My conjecture is that Finnis accepts this presupposition
because he believes that all orgasmic sexual activity, whether contracepted or not, whether homosexual or heterosexual, constitutes a single kind of activity which can properly be understood
in only one way. That is, Finnis would argue that orgasmic sexual
activity can be understood as intelligible only if there is one
good, one kind of sexual intimacy, which everyone engaging in
orgasmic sexual activity wants to actualize and experience. That
good is realized, Finnis argues, in voluntary, uncontracepted heterosexual sex which takes place in the context of marriage.
Other kinds of sexual activity, including homosexual activity, are,
he might think, imitations of this single paradigm of sex and
attempts to realize this single good. This latter claim may seem
compelling to those whose paradigm of homosexual activity is
penetrative male homosexual activity.'
Perhaps penetrative
male homosexual sex seems sufficiently like uncontracepted penetrative heterosexual activity to license the supposition that the
former is a witting or unwitting imitation of the latter.
One of the problems with this line of thought, however, is
that it ignores the diversity of sexual experiences, prominently
including the experiences of homosexual women. My concluding suggestion that those who think Finnis' conclusions about
orgasmic homosexual activity incorrect should refuse to assimilate it to deliberately contracepted heterosexual sex. Instead,
they should distinguish various kinds of loving sexual activity.
Perhaps they will find different social and biological units, and
different functions, goods and characteristic activities, associated
with each. If so, then they may also make some progress in arguing that homosexual sex in the context of a loving and committed life-long relationship can fully realize some of those goods.
29. This is clearly Grisez's model. In considering the morality of same-sex
relations, he eschews the noun "homosexual" in favor of the word "sodomite".
See, e.g., GRISEZ, supra note 5, at 653.

1995]

A PROPOS OF PROFESSOR PERRY
APPENDIX

A

RECONSTRUCTION OF
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RATIONALE

O

(1) Groups united and acting in the way groups typically or naturally unite and act to perform a function thereby constitute one
reality of the sort which has that function. TACIT ASSUMPTION
(2) "Reproduction is one function." EXPLICIT ASSUMPTION
(3) So groups united and acting in the way groups typically or
naturally unite and act to perform the function of reproduction
constitute one reality of the sort which has that function. FROM
(1) AND (2)
(4) The voluntary and uncontracepted union of their reproductive organs is the way husband and wife typically or naturally
unite and act to perform the function of reproduction. TACIT
ASSUMPTION
(5) So a husband and wife whose reproductive organs are voluntarily and uncontraceptively united are one reality of the sort
which has the function of reproduction: "in respect of that function, the spouses are indeed one reality." FROM (3) AND (4)
(6) Human reproduction is a biological function. TACIT
ASSUMPTION
(7) Whatever is one reality with a biological function is one biological reality. TACIT ASSUMPTION
(8) So husband and wife whose reproductive organs are voluntarily and uncontraceptively united are one biological reality.
FROM (5),(6) AND (7)
(9) Whenever two things are united in one biological reality, they
are really united biologically; the union makes of them a "biological unit."3' TACIT ASSUMPTION
(10) So "the union of the reproductive organs of husband and
wife really unites them biologically;" the union makes of them a
biological unit of the sort which has the function of reproduction. FROM (8) AND (9)
(11) The biological reality of the human person is logically inseparable from her personal reality. TACIT ASSUMPTION
(12) Human beings united in a biological unit are thereby
united in a "personal reality" which has among its functions the
functions of the biological unit. FROM (11)
30. FINNIS, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1066; FinnisJ.L. Emics & PUB. POL'Y,
.
supra note 2, at 28-29 (first half of what Perry refers to as Paragraph 6 unless

hereinafter noted).
31.

Grisez uses the term "organic unit." GRIsEz, supra note 5, at 570.
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(13) So human beings united in a biological unit which has the
function of human reproduction are thereby united in a "personal reality" which has among its functions the function of
reproduction. FROM (12)
(14) The functions of personal realities, realities constituted by
human persons, are fulfilled in distinctively human ways: ways
that engage their reason, will and social capacities. TACIT
ASSUMPTION
(15) So the functions of personal realities with the function of
reproduction are fulfilled in distinctively human ways: ways that
engage their reason, will and social capacities. FROM (2) AND
(14)
(16) Procreation, fulfills the function of reproduction in distinctively human ways if and only if accompanied by friendship.
TACIT ASSUMPTION
(17) So parenthood and friendship together fulfill the function
of human reproduction. FROM (16)
(18) The fulfillment of a biological function can be actualized
and experienced by normal units of the sort which have that
function, when they act in the way such units typically or naturally act to perform that function. TACIT ASSUMPTION
(19) So the fulfillment of the function of human reproduction
can be actualized and experienced by normal personal units of
the sort which have the function of human reproduction, when
they act in the way such units typically or naturally act to perform
that function. FROM (6) AND (18)
(20) So parenthood and friendship can be actualized and experienced by normal personal units of the sort which have the function of human reproduction, when they act in the way such units
typically or naturally act to perform that function. FROM (17)
AND (19)
(21) So parenthood and friendship can be actualized and experienced by normal personal units of the sort which have the function of human reproduction, when their reproductive organs are
voluntarily and uncontraceptively united. FROM (4) AND (20)
(22) So spouses' "sexual union therefore can actualizeand allow
them to experience" parenthood and friendship. FROM (10), (13)
AND (21)
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(23) Marriage is "the real giving to each other of two people in
biological, affective and volitional union in mutual commitment
which is open-ended and exclusive." 2 EXPLICIT ASSUMPTION
(24) Two people really give to each other in biological union
only if they are "really unite[d] biologically" by their sexual
union. TACIT ASSUMPTION
(25) So being married entails that the two people are "really
unite[d] biologically" by their sexual union. FROM (23) AND
(24)
(26) Two people are "really unite [d] biologically" by their sexual
union only if they thereby constitute a biological unit of the sort
which has the function of reproduction. TACIT ASSUMPTION
(27) So being married entails that a husband and wife constitute
by their sexual union a biological unit of the sort which has the
function of reproduction. FROM (10) AND (26)
(28) So being married entails that a husband and wife constitute
by their sexual. union a personal unit of the sort which has the
function of reproduction. FROM (13) AND (27)
(29) If being married entails that a husband and wife are continuously or episodically a unit of some sort, then the end or good
of marriage includes the end or, good of units of that sort.3 3
TACIT ASSUMPTION
(30) So the end or good of marriage includes the end or good of
units which have the function of reproduction. FROM (28) AND
(29)
(31) The end or good of some unit of the sort which has a given
function includes actualizing and experiencing the fulfillment of
that function. TACIT ASSUMPTION
(32) So the end or good of a personal unit of the sort which has
the function of reproduction includes actualizing and experiencing the fulfillment of the function of reproduction. FROM (2)
AND (31)
(33) So the end or good of a personal unit of the sort which has
the function of reproduction includes actualizing and experiencing parenthood and friendship. FROM (17) AND (32)
(34) So the ends or goods of marriage include actualizing and
experiencing parenthood and friendship. FROM (30) AND (33)
32. FINNIs, L. REv., supranote 2, at 1067; Finnis,J.L. ETHiCS & PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 2, at 29-30.
33. Cf FINNIS, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1067; Finnis, J.L. ETHiCS & PUB.
POL'Y, supra note 2, at 30. (remark about "actualizing the all-level unity of
marriage").
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(35) Actualizing and experiencing the fulfillment of the function
of a unit is or is part of the unit's intrinsic fulfillment or perfection. TACIT ASSUMPTION
(36) So actualizing and experiencing the fulfillment of the function of human reproduction is part of the intrinsic fulfillment or
perfection of the personal unit whose function is human reproduction. FROM (35)
(37) So actualizing and experiencing "parenthood and [friendship] are [or are parts of] the intrinsic fulfillment"' or perfection
of the personal unit whose function is human reproduction.
FROM (17) AND (36)
(38) If being married entails that a husband and wife episodically
constitute a personal unit of the sort which has the function of
human reproduction, then the intrinsic good of that unit is an
intrinsic good of marriage. TACIT ASSUMPTION
(39) So the intrinsic fulfillment or perfection of the personal
unit the function of which is human reproduction is an intrinsic
fulfillment or perfection of marriage. FROM (28) AND (38)
(40) So actualizing and experiencing parenthood and friendship
are or are parts of the intrinsic fulfillment or perfection of marriage. FROM (37) AND (39)
(41) The goods of marriage are common goods actualized and
experienced by husband and wife. FROM (16) AND (34)
(42) So parenthood and friendship are among the common ends
or common goods actualized and experienced by husband and
wife. FROM (34) AND (41)
(43) The fulfillment of human reproduction is a good actualized
and experienced by intelligent creatures. FROM (15)
(44) So parenthood and friendship are an intelligible good.
FROM (17) AND (43)
(45) So the actualization and experience of parenthood and
friendship are a common and intelligible good which is an intrinsic fulfillment or perfection of marriage. FROM (40), (42) AND
(44)
(46) Spouses' "sexual union therefore can actualize and allow
them to experience their real common good - their marriage with
the two goods, parenthood and friendship which (leaving aside
the order of grace) are the parts of its wholeness as an intelligible
common good." FROM (22) AND (45)
34.

FINNis, L. REv., supra note 2, at 1065; Finnis,J.L. ETHics & PuB. POL'Y,

supra note 2, at 27.

